In addition to wishing to preclude such methods of aggregation, decision theorists have often posited further restrictions on aggregation. Roughly speaking, such restrictions have arisen from the belief that the agreement of individuals on certain features of the distribution in question ought to be preserved in the corresponding consensual distribution. It has often been posited as an axiom of aggregation, for example, that if all individuals assign an event the same probability, then the consensual probability assigned to that event should respect their agreement.
Other common features of individual distributions have also been deemed worthy of preservation in consensual distributions. Laddaga [4] and Schmitt [6] have argued, for example, that when individuals assign probabilities to atomic events E l9 ..., E k in such a way that some pair of events A and B in the algebra generated by E { ,...,E k turns out to be independent on each of their assignments, consensual probabilities should be assigned so that A and B are independent.
Lehrer and Wagner [5] have argued against this constraint on aggregation, stressing that when individuals direct their initial acts of assessment at the probabilities of events which partition a set of possibilities, independence of events in the algebra generated by this partition is of negligible epistemic significance. This argument was supplemented by a proof that if (a) the consensual probability assigned to each atomic event depends only on the probabilities assigned by individuals to that event, (b) the consensual probability of an atomic event is zero if all individuals assign that event probability zero, and (c) consensual distributions preserve instances of independence common to all individual distributions, then aggregation must be dictatorial. 1 In the present paper we delete even the unanimity condition (b) and prove that an aggregation method satisfying just (a) and (c) above must still be either dictatorial or imposed.
Irrelevance of alternatives and preservation of independence
Suppose that a PAM F is required to determine consensual probabilities in such a way that the consensual probability assigned to each event depends only on the probabilities assigned by individulas to that event. This restriction on aggregation may be formalized as follows:
Irrelevance of alternatives (IA)
There exist functions f/. Note that the functions/} may vary from event to event, subject only to the condition that for any set of vectors Z\,.. ,
Condition (2.1) follows from applying F to the matrix P, they th column of which is z/, j = 1,..., k, and using the fact (implicit in the definition of a PAM) that consensual probabilities must sum to one.
As a preliminary to formalizing the requirement that consensual distributions preserve instances of independence common to all individual distributions, we recall that the algebra Cί of events generated by the partition E u ..., E k consists of the empty set, along with all possible unions of the atomic events, E u ..., E k . Consensual probabilities p u ..., p k assigned to these events by a PAM F induce a consensual probability measure TΓ on β in the obvious way: if A =E jχ U .. 
., n => π(A Π B) =τc(A)τc(B).

PIj TTi(A), τn(B) > 0 and TCJ(
.
ττ(B)< 1 and π(AΠB) =π(A)π(B).
Although we shall be concerned with PAMs satisfying just IA and some PI axiom, we state, for ease of reference, a class of unanimity axioms. In particular, if a = 0, we get
In terms of the aforementioned axioms, Lehrer and Wagner ( [5] , Theorem 1) showed that if k > 3, a PAM satisfying IA, U(0), and PI 0 or PIj must be dictatorial, and if k > 4, a PAM satisfying IA, U(0), and PI 2 must be dictatorial. 2 In what follows we use recent results of Aczel et al. [1] to describe, for each of the aforementioned PI conditions, the PAMs satisfying IA. We shall see that, even in this setting, dictatorial aggregation may be avoided only by imposing an external consensual distribution.
Three limitative theorems
The following three theorems describe the PAMs satisfying IA and PI,, for / = 0, 1, or 2. Proofs of these theorems appear in the Appendix. Thus, if k > 3, the only nondictatorial PAMs satisfying IA and PI 0 impose a consensual distribution which assigns some fixed atomic event Ej the probability one and all other atomic events the probability zero. n so thatF(P) = (ό 17 ,..., δ w ), VPG(P(«, A:).
Theorem 3.2 ^ PAMF: (P(n, k) -• (P(A:), wAer^ k > 3, satisfies IA and PIi iff it is dictatorial.
Proof: Sufficiency is clear.
Necessity. We show that F must satisfy U(0) and then invoke Theorem 1 of [5] . If U(0) is assumed to be violated, we proceed as in the preceding proof to show that if 7/(0) > 0 for some /G {1, ...,£), then 9 where
The weights may, subject to certain restrictions which need not concern us here, be negative. However, it is always the case that Σ ω /-1> an<^ 2^ω /= 1, the weights must all be nonnegative, in which case each pj is an ordinary weighted arithmetic mean of the entries in the 7 th column of P, with weights invariant across j. In order to prove (A.9) consider the matrices P and P* defined as follows: Choose indices m and r distinct from each other, and fromy and /. (To simplify notation we denote \/k by the Greek letter K). Column j of P is κ τ ; columns / and r are each (Vic -K) T ; column m is (1 -2Vκ 4-K) T ; the remaining columns of P, if any, are 0 T . P* is the matrix resulting from the interchange of columns j and / in P.
Theorem 3.3 A PAM F: (P(Λ, 4) -»(P(4) satisfies IA and PI 2 iff it is dictatorial or F(P)
Denote by TΓ, and π* the individual probability measures associated to P and P* and let We now show that if k > 5, then ω Λ+1 = 0, from which it follows from (A. 17) that fj(O) = 0, j = 1,..., k. Thus for k > 5, a PAM satisfying IA and PI 2 satisfies U(0) and is hence, by the aforementioned theorem of Lehrer and Wagner, dictatorial. In order to show that ω n+ϊ -0 if k > 5, we again denote l/kby K and consider the matrix P, defined as follows: columns 1 and 3 of P are (2/c -4κ 2 To simplify notation we show that ωi = 0, from which the general proof will be clear. Consider the following matrix P: column 1 of P is (4/9, 1/9,..., 1/9) Γ ; columns 2 and 4 are (2/9) τ ; column 3 is (1/9, 4/9,..., 4/9) τ . By the usual argument we conclude that for A=E ι UE 2 and B = E 2 2. It is easy to see that if k < 3, PI 2 is (vacuously) satisfied by every PAM.
